




I. Background of the Uruguay Round Negotiations
In 1947, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was signed,
establishing tariff and general trade obligations intended to operate under the
umbrella of the International Trade Organization (ITO). The ITO was expected
to complement the two Bretton Woods institutions already established-the Inter-
national Monetary Fund and International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment-in facilitating global economic recovery following World War II. How-
ever, the ITO never came into existence, principally because the United States
Congress did not approve it.
The GATT sought to fill the gap, and promoted liberalized trade through
its provisions and, over the years, successive "rounds" of multilateral trade
negotiations (MTN). The first six MTN rounds succeeded dramatically in reduc-
ing tariff levels around the world. Yet as tariffs declined, nontariff barriers to
trade sprang up: subsidies, corporate dumping, "buy national" requirements,
nontransparent rules, the valuation of imports so as to maximize applicable cus-
toms duties, and standards nominally erected to protect health or safety but in
fact applied to restrict trade. The net gains from tariff reduction were seriously
eroded by the GATT's failure to address the new, nontariff barriers.
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The seventh, Tokyo MTN Round took the first, albeit faltering, steps to impose
discipline on the new nontariff barriers to trade. Various "codes" were negotiated
to supplement the GATT's basic rules on trade in products. However, these codes
were voluntary, and far from all GATT contracting parties acceded to them.
Moreover, the rules themselves were only incremental steps toward, not the final
destination of, trade liberalization.
The United States sought to capitalize on the Tokyo Round momentum as early
as 1982, at a ministerial conference in Geneva. U.S. Trade Representative Bill
Brock urged his counterparts to kick off another MTN round, to continue where
the Tokyo Round left off. However, the U.S. effort failed. The European Commu-
nity became increasingly self-absorbed, in particular with the EC 1992 Single
Market Initiative, and the United States increasingly relied on bilateral and pluri-
lateral efforts to expand trade, initially through free trade agreements with Israel
and Canada.
In 1985, the U.S. trade deficit skyrocketed. Over 300 trade bills were intro-
duced in the Congress that year, many of them protectionist. The second Reagan
administration confronted strong political pressure to close the U.S. market
against imports from foreign markets that were not reciprocally open to U.S.
exports. The hue and cry was to obtain a "level playing field." The Reagan
administration aimed to show more progress toward free trade, to maintain U.S.
political support for it, and to reap its economic benefits. The United States again
led a campaign to launch another MTN round.
In 1986, the United States succeeded in convincing GATT contracting parties
to do so. U.S. Trade Representative Clayton Yeutter and other administration
officials represented the United States at the ministerial conference convened
in Punta del Este, Uruguay, in September 1986. Urged by the United States,
contracting parties agreed to begin negotiations to extend the frontiers of the
GATT to cover trade in services, the protection of intellectual property, and to
a limited extent, trade-related investment measures, as well as to improve existing
GATT rules.
The negotiations proceeded rather slowly over the next two years. This pace
had been anticipated, however, and ministers had agreed to hold a ministerial
Midterm Review to facilitate both progress and the pace thereof by securing
ministerial-level attention, identifying issues requiring resolution, and charting
a course for the remaining two years of talks.
At the Midterm Review (in December 1988, the twilight of the second Reagan
administration), some concrete results were achieved, which were formalized at
the following April GATT meeting (during the early Bush administration). In
particular, contracting parties agreed to apply ad referendum new procedural
rules for the settlement of disputes, to expedite the legal proceedings under article
XXIII. For the most part, however, the results of the Midterm Review under-
scored the need to accelerate actual bargaining, as opposed to merely identifying
issues and posturing on original positions.
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The ministerial meeting at which the negotiations were scheduled to conclude
was held in Brussels in December 1990. While negotiators met in good faith
and sought to develop a number of compromises in various negotiating groups,
ultimately discussions in all areas broke down over the impasse in a single negotiat-
ing group, agriculture. While the United States offered to put all agricultural
issues on the negotiating table, the European Community refused. Despite an
eleventh hour Swedish compromise proposal, the agricultural negotiations failed.
Third-world representatives then declined to pursue negotiations in other substan-
tive areas, since access to developed country markets for agricultural goods was
one of their two principal objectives in the Uruguay Round. (The other was
access to developed country markets for textile and apparel goods.)
The GATT Secretariat tried again to bring the talks to closure by scheduling
a ministerial meeting in Geneva a year later, in December 1991. Because talks
again broke down, the then director-general of the GATT, Arthur Dunkel, sought
to facilitate a breakthrough by issuing a document prepared by the GATT Secretar-
iat. The Draft Final Act, made available in December 1991, did not purport to
represent a negotiated agreement, but rather what the Secretariat perceived to
be a likely consensus of views. Mr. Dunkel's object presumably was to crystallize
consensus where it had been achieved, and focus future negotiations on the re-
maining issues and the Secretariat's particular suggestions for resolving them.
Issuance of the "Dunkel text" spurred another effort to conclude negotiations,
but it petered out in the absence of substantial progress. The United States then
became diverted by the 1992 presidential election campaign, the results of which
ensured that the U.S. negotiating team would change in 1993 at the highest levels.
With the certain arrival of a new set of negotiators, other nations became newly
interested in exploring any likelihood of achieving closure in the talks before the
experienced Bush administration team was replaced.
Consequently, there were serious efforts following the November 1992 U.S.
election to close on agreements. While the new Clinton administration was not
in place and could be consulted only unofficially, the idea was to wrap up the
Round, let the outgoing Bush administration bear the brunt of any criticism of
the results, and then allow the Clinton administration to proceed with its trade
agenda (rather than continue a Reagan-Bush legacy agenda) following the legisla-
tive implementation of the Round.
Despite the best efforts of Ambassador Carla Hills and many others, however,
the final breakthrough proved elusive. Much progress was made, but then essen-
tially lost when negotiators were unable to agree on final concessions.
II. Closure at Long Last
The Clinton team then took over, with Ambassador Mickey Kantor succeeding
Ambassador Hills. The Clinton team obtained fast-track negotiating authority
(which had expired) in July 1993 on the eve of the Tokyo G-7 Economic Summit.
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The new fast-track authority deliberately had a short fuse: it applied only to trade
agreements that the President notified to the Congress by December 15, 1993,
and signed by April 15, 1994. The concept was to provide just enough time to
close negotiations, and not enough time to invite further delay.
It worked. Negotiators finally closed on agreements, in all but a few cases,
in December, enabling the President to provide the requisite notice to the Congress
on December 15, 1993. The Final Act then was signed in Marrakech, Morocco,
on April 15, 1994.
Perfection ever eludes trade negotiators and agreements, of course. For exam-
ple, no agreement was reached on basic telecommunications services; instead,
it was decided to continue negotiations. With respect to financial services, more-
over, a last minute Decision on Financial Services and the inclusion of an addi-
tional annex to the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) allow for the
GATS provisions on financial services to enter into force on a most-favored-nation
(MFN) basis for an initial six months. During that six-month period, negotiations
aimed at improving the level and quality of those commitments will continue.
Such discussions will be without prejudice to the right of countries to modify
(or even withdraw) their commitments, as they see fit, in the light of the results
of those negotiations, before the end of the six-month period.
In addition to these "legacy" negotiations, the U.S. administration urged other
contracting parties to agree to embark on a new, post-Uruguay Round negotiating
agenda focused on environmental, labor, and competition issues. While agreement
was reached to establish a permanent Committee on Trade and the Environment,
the discussions up until the eve of the Marrakech ministerial meeting on April 15,
1994, failed to produce a similar agreement regarding labor issues.
III. U.S. Legislative Implementation
With the Final Act signed at Marrakech, "all" that remained in the United
States was for the President to submit, and the Congress to pass, legislation to
change U.S. law in a manner necessary and appropriate to implement the new
agreements. The administration began negotiating the contents of the implement-
ing bill with the Congress, since any bill submitted under fast-track procedures
could not be amended. While the fast-track procedures ensure expedited consider-
ation of proposed legislation, they also put pressure on the administration to "get
it right" since any bill submitted cannot be modified subsequently to obtain votes
needed for passage.
The administration and Congress negotiated for months. In addition to an army
of smaller issues, they were plagued by various larger issues as well, such as
whether and for how long to extend the Generalized System of Preferences; and
whether to provide for parity for Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) beneficiaries
that enjoy less access to the U.S. textile and apparel market than provided by
the North American Free Trade Agreement. The issues that loomed largest,
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however, were whether to further extend fast-track authority, and how to satisfy
the pay-as-you-go budget rules (which require offsetting the revenues lost as a
result of Uruguay Round tariff reductions). Much of the delay in coming to
closure with the Congress resulted from the administration's treading warily on
the revenue issues, to try to ensure bipartisan support.
The administration's inability to obtain bipartisan support for the proposed
fast-track extension led to the deletion of this proposal from the implementing
bill. President Clinton found his administration caught between the demands of
rival congressional leaders and rival ideas. House Republican Leader-to-be Newt
Gingrich, among others (mostly Republicans), insisted that any extension of
fast-track authority for legislation to implement trade agreements could not
be linked to environmental or labor issues. House Majority Leader Richard
Gephardt, among others (mostly Democrats), insisted that any future fast-track
authority must be linked irrevocably to labor and environmental negotiations.
In its original proposals, the administration at least nodded in Mr. Gephardt's
direction, to the satisfaction of apparently no one. To linkage supporters, the
nod was too little; to linkage opponents, the nod was too much. Unable to navigate
a course that retained bipartisan support for the rest of the bill, the administration
reluctantly dropped its fast-track contents.
The President fared better on the funding issues. After prolonged negotiations,
the administration finally found an acceptable formula for meeting the House
rule requiring the offset of all revenues lost from the tariff cuts over five years.
However, it became clear early in the process that the administration would be
unable to offset the revenues lost from tariff cuts over ten years, which was
necessary to satisfy the more stringent Senate budget rule. Any legislation that
fails to satisfy this rule is subject to a point of order. To prevail in the Senate,
then, the administration would need sixty votes, rather than a simple majority.
Finally in September, the administration closed negotiations. The fast-track
extension was history, the revenues lost over five years accounted for, the Gener-
alized System of Preferences extended for ten months, and CBI parity left for
another legislative vehicle. The antidumping provisions were rewritten, a new
rule of origin established for textile and apparel goods, and the Super 301 trade
remedy (based on the threat of unilateral U.S. action) reenacted for another two
years. With these final issues resolved, the stage was set for unprecedentedly
fast action under fast-track procedures. The President submitted the bill to the
Congress on September 27, 1994, in the expectation that the Congress would
pass it prior to adjournment in the first week in October.
Having made concessions to many members in the negotiating process, the
administration felt it had the votes it needed. Beyond substance, it relied upon
procedural cooperation from the Democratically controlled House and Senate
for lightning-fast action. Contrary to its name, the fast track is not necessarily
fast. It ensures votes in the House and Senate on trade bills affecting revenues
within ninety "legislative" days of submission-which normally is about six
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months. The Clinton administration hoped to achieve enactment instead within
seven to ten days of the bill's introduction.
The vote in the Senate, however, was postponed until December because Sena-
tor Ernest Hollings (D-SC) refused to permit the Senate Commerce Committee,
which he chaired, to discharge the bill earlier than required under the fast-track
procedures. He thus used his committee's jurisdiction over a small portion of
the bill to block a Senate vote before December. The Senate's delay in acting
on the bill then was replicated by the House of Representatives, which also chose
to take up the bill after the November 8, 1994, elections. Ultimately, the House
passed the bill 288 to 146, and the Senate followed suit, 76 to 24.
IV. The World Trade Organization (WTO)
To set the stage for the six symposium articles that follow, this preface discusses
briefly the WTO itself. The WTO Agreement will: (1) provide a new legal basis
for the international movement of goods and services, the protection of intellectual
property rights, and to a lesser extent, trade-related investments; (2) furnish a
common organizational and institutional framework for the conduct of trade rela-
tions among its members; and (3) act as a forum for negotiations on further trade
liberalization and additional legal disciplines.
A key difference between the GATT and the WTO is that the WTO Agreement
is a "single undertaking," integrating many Uruguay Round and previous GATT
agreements into a single legal framework. This approach helps resolve four prob-
lems with the GATT. First, by integrating most of the agreements, it eliminates the
current fragmentation of GATT rights and responsibilities. Under the integrated
system, all WTO members will be bound by the multilateral agreements, including
the integrated dispute settlement system and surveillance under the trade policy
review mechanism.
Second, such integration, coupled with the increased responsibilities of devel-
oping countries, reduces the GATT problem of "free riders." The WTO
Agreement often provides developing countries longer transition periods in which
to assume new obligations, but ultimately they are required to perform obligations,
just as are developed countries. Moreover, while waivers of obligations may be
available, especially for least developed countries, they are subject to supermajor-
ity votes of WTO members and must be specifically limited in duration.
Third, the trade-liberalizing momentum of the Uruguay Round, combined with
the increasing globalization of the world economy, have induced more countries
to join the GATT process. Twenty-five countries became contracting parties since
the Uruguay Round began in 1986, and major accession negotiations are ongoing.
Thus, the WTO is likely to be more nearly universal than was the GATT.
Fourth, the GATT was originally concluded in 1947 on a provisional basis;
over forty-five years later, many contracting parties, including the United States,
still apply the GATT through the Protocol of Provisional Application. This provi-
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sional approach, with its "grandfather" protection of certain nonconforming
measures, has been replaced by a definitive application of the Final Act of the
Uruguay Round.
The basic principles of the new "GATT 1994" remain largely the same as
the "GATT 1947." The Multilateral Trade Agreements listed in Annexes 1, 2,
and 3 to the WTO Agreement form "integral" parts of that Agreement. Annex
1A is the GATT 1994, which includes the GATT 1947 and associated legal
instruments, notably including the protocols of accession, list of valid waivers,
and understandings on balance-of-payments provisions, state trading, and waivers
under article XXV:5. The Uruguay Round Protocol to the GATT 1994 lists the
Schedules of Concessions of the WTO members, divided into five appendices.
New in this section is the addition of agricultural products. The new schedules
come into effect with respect to a WTO member on the day the WTO Agreement
enters into force for that member. (However, the least developed countries have
been given an extra year to file their tariff schedules.)
Annex IA also includes sectoral agreements and agreements on implementation
of basic GATT trade rules on agriculture, sanitary and phytosanitary measures,
textiles and clothing, technical barriers to trade, trade-related investment mea-
sures, customs valuation, antidumping measures, preshipment inspection, rules
of origin, import licensing procedures, subsidies and countervailing measures,
and safeguards.
Annex 1B is the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), Annex
IC the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
including Trade in Counterfeit Goods (TRIPS). Another agreement binding on
all WTO members is the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes (Annex 2), which applies to the WTO Agreement, all the
annexed multilateral trade agreements, and any annexed plurilateral agreement
for which the signatories confirm such application. Annex 3 carries forward
another multilateral agreement, the Trade Policy Review Mechanism, which was
commenced during the Uruguay Round.
The WTO Agreement provides for two categories of members: (1) original
members, open to the contracting parties of the GATT 1947 as of the date of
entry into force of the Agreement and the European Communities, and (2) mem-
bership by accession for any other state (or separate customs territory with auton-
omy for the conduct of its external commercial relations) on terms agreed between
it and the WTO.
The principal organ of the WTO is the Ministerial Conference, composed of
representatives of all members. The Ministerial Conference is required to meet
at least once every two years. During the periods between such conferences, the
governing body is the General Council, the direct descendant of the GATT Coun-
cil, likewise composed of representatives of all members. The General Council
is assisted in its work by three subcouncils, the Council for Trade in Goods, the
Council for Trade in Services, and the Council for Trade-Related Aspects of
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Intellectual Property Rights. Each of these bodies oversees the functioning of
the relevant agreement at Annex IA, IB, and 1C, as appropriate. The General
Council also is charged with convening, on an ad hoc basis, the Dispute Settlement
Body as provided for in the Dispute Settlement Understanding at Annex 2, and
the Trade Policy Review Body, as provided for in the Trade Policy Review
Mechanism at Annex 3. It will establish rules of procedure for the existing standing
committees on Trade and Development, Balance-of-Payments Restrictions, Trade
and the Environment, and Budget, Finance, and Administration, as well as for
any other standing committees the Ministerial Conference may establish.
The WTO Agreement provides for a Secretariat, headed by a director-general
appointed by the Ministerial Conference. The director-general is responsible for
appointing members of staff of the Secretariat. To the extent practicable, the
Secretariat of the GATT 1947 is intended to be carried over to the WTO. The
WTO will remain headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland, and will be accorded
the normal privileges and immunities necessary to carry out its functions.
The GATT practice with respect to decision making, with a preference for
"consensus" decisions, is carried over into the WTO. Where formal voting is
required, each WTO member has one vote in the Ministerial Conference and in
the General Council. The WTO Agreement specifies that the MFN provisions
in the GATT 1994, GATS, and TRIPS agreements, and the WTO amendment
provisions may be amended only upon acceptance by all members. It specifies
a supermajority vote on certain matters, such as the issuance of any waiver.
The WTO is intended to act as a forum for ongoing negotiations on further
trade liberalization measures and additional legal disciplines. However, members
could, at some stage in the future, seek to hold further rounds of multilateral
trade negotiations.
V. The Focus of This Issue
While the Uruguay Round covers all economic activity to some extent and
other Uruguay Round agreements warrant review, this symposium focuses on
six particular agreements: intellectual property, dispute settlement, agriculture,
government procurement, services, and antidumping measures.
Three of these agreements-intellectual property, dispute settlement, and agricul-
ture-merit particularly close scrutiny for their pioneering achievements, as they
represent the greatest leaps in international trade rule making. In reaching agreement
on intellectual property protection, the GATT frontiers were extended dramatically.
In improving the GATT rules for settling disputes, the Uruguay Round outcome
helps establish the credibility of the new WTO and increases confidence that any
dispute about the application of WTO rules will be resolved effectively and expedi-
tiously. In establishing meaningful and specific discipline on agricultural trade for
the first time, the Uruguay Round seeks to compensate for previous GATT rounds
and rules that were both inadequate and inadequately observed.
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The fourth subject addressed in this symposium, government procurement,
was actually negotiated on a separate but parallel track to the Uruguay Round.
Government procurement was not included in the negotiating mandate at the
Punta del Este ministerial meeting in September 1986. In fact, the negotiations
recently concluded began only after the Montreal Midterm Review in December
1988, and were concluded in January 1994, after the Uruguay Round Final Act
was agreed (but not signed) in December 1993. Moreover, the Agreement on
Government Procurement will remain a plurilateral rather than multilateral
agreement, so that its application will remain voluntary rather than mandatory.
Nonetheless, in light of the continuing significance of government procurements
in world trade and the substantive expansion of the agreement with respect to
its scope and coverage, this agreement is expected to be one of the large and
lasting accomplishments of the Uruguay Round.
The fifth subject of this symposium, the General Agreement on Trade in Ser-
vices, is disappointing relative to the large expectations regarding it. While the
efforts and rhetoric were ambitious, the results fall short of achieving widespread
liberalization in many traded services. Moreover, there is no general requirement
to eliminate or phase out inconsistent measures in effect at the time the WTO
enters into force. Nevertheless, the increasing significance of services in global
trade means that the GATS results achieved thus far, as well as any further results
of ongoing negotiations in key sectors, merit careful examination.
The sixth subject of this symposium is one of the most controversial and
technical. Neither supporters nor detractors of the antidumping laws claim that
the agreement achieved is likely to be, or should be, a long-lived beacon on the
trade horizons. Beneficiaries of the U.S. antidumping law and antidumping duties
claim that the antidumping agreement imperils the ability of the United States
to protect its producers against injuriously traded goods offered for sale in the
U.S. market at below "fair value." To the contrary, claim other U.S. producers
that export and import, the antidumping agreement does not do enough to liberal-
ize trade, and prevent antidumping proceedings from functioning as a serious
barrier to trade. In light of the particular controversy surrounding this hypertechni-
cal agreement, a debate between these two viewpoints is included, rather than
a single analysis embracing one of these viewpoints (or trying to eschew them
both).
With the exception of the antidumping debate, this symposium does not analyze
the domestic implementing measures of the United States or other contracting
parties. Rather, the focus is on the new substantive rules achieved in critical
subject areas, and the directions of the new WTO. The articles and debate served
by this issue should thus provide a foundation for study of the various domestic
implementing measures, other Uruguay Round agreements, the relationship be-
tween the new multilateral agreements and other trade-liberalizing initiatives,
and the application of the new rules to particular facts, as in dispute settlement
proceedings.
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